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1  INTRODUCTION 
And you have never considered what manner of men are these Athenians with whom you will 
have to fight, and how utterly unlike yourselves. They are revolutionary, equally quick in the 
conception and in the execution of every new plan; while you are careful only to keep what 
you have, originating nothing, and not acting even when action is most urgent. They are bold 
beyond their strength; they run risks which prudence would condemn; and in the midst of 
misfortune they are full of hope. Whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly; when 
your plans are most prudent, to distrust them; and when calamities come upon you, to think 
that you will never be delivered from them. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory; they 
are always abroad, and you are always at home. For they think to gain something by leaving 
their homes; but you, that any new enterprise may damage what you have already. When 
conquerors, they pursue their victory to the utmost; when defeated, they fall back the least. 
Their bodies they devote to their country as though they belonged to other men; their true self 
is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. When they do not 
carry out an intention which they have formed, they think they have been robbed of their own 
property; when an enterprise succeeds, they have gained a mere instalment of what is to 
come; but if they fail, they at once conceive new hopes and so fill up the void. For they alone 
have something almost as soon as they hope for it, for they lose not a moment in the 
execution of an idea. This is the lifelong task, full of danger and toil, which they are always 
imposing upon themselves. None enjoy their good things less, because they are always 
seeking for more. To do their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to 
be as disagreeable as the most tiresome business. If a man should say of them, in a word, that 
they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to allow peace to other men, he would 
simply speak the truth.1 
 
1  Thucydides 1.70: οὐδ’ ἐκλογίσασθαι πώποτε πρὸς οἵους ὑµῖν Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ὅσον 
ὑµῶν καὶ ὡς πᾶν διαφέροντας ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται. οἱ µέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς 
καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν· ὑµεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σῴζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι µηδὲν 
καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. αὖθις δὲ οἱ µὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναµιν τολµηταὶ καὶ 
παρὰ γνώµην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑµέτερον τῆς τε δυνάµεως 
ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι τῆς τε γνώµης µηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι τῶν τε δεινῶν µηδέποτε 
οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. καὶ µὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑµᾶς µελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδηµηταὶ πρὸς 
ἐνδηµοτάτους· οἴονται γὰρ οἱ µὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑµεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ 
ἑτοῖµα ἂν βλάψαι. κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται καὶ νικώµενοι ἐπ’ 
ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς µὲν σώµασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως 
χρῶνται, τῇ δὲ γνώµῃ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. καὶ ἃ µὲν ἂν ἐπινοή-
σαντες µὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἃ δ’ ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, 
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In this passage (set in 431 BCE), Corinthian ambassadors to Sparta comment on 
the national characters of the Athenians and the Spartans, in a speech to the 
Spartan Assembly. Ancient texts that do not obviously portray deep, powerful 
sensations or displays of e.g. anger/shame/grief, which quickly bring about some 
great reaction and reversal of fortune (emotions and emotion scenarios that are 
prevalent, and have been widely studied, in epic and tragedy), have generally been 
overlooked by those studying the emotions of the Greeks. And yet, if we read this 
passage more closely, the characters of both Athenians and Spartans – juxtaposed 
as polar opposites – involve emotions. These are not, perhaps, sharp and short-
lived (as are anger/shame/grief etc.), but longer-term emotions and perceptions of 
feelings determined by culture are equally important. Here Thucydides talks about 
the Athenians’ hopeful character (the word ‘hope’ [elpis] appears three times in 
this short passage), contrasted with the Spartans’ caution and distrust. The 
Athenians are ‘revolutionary’, ‘bold’, ‘impetuous’, thinking about ‘gain’ – words 
implying hope, confidence, and a lack of fear. The Spartans, on the other hand, 
are ‘careful’, ‘distrustful’, thinking about ‘damage’ – words implying caution, 
fear, and a lack of confidence. 
We must not forget that this is a speech to an audience of Spartans, who 
would have reacted emotionally to what they were hearing – perhaps they would 
have felt shame or anger, and perhaps this would have affected their response? 
The speech, too, was given in a physical setting, i.e. at an assembly, where the 
speakers were probably situated on a bêma (speaker’s platform), talking 
downwards to the Spartan listeners. What effect might this spatial arrangement 
have had on the listeners’ emotions? Such a question is perhaps only answerable 
after considering many more examples of emotion arousal in deliberative contexts 
(that is, speeches to Assemblies, Councils etc.). Interestingly too, these words are 
put into the mouths of Corinthians, addressed to Spartans, in front of Athenians. 
Are they the Corinthians’ genuine views; or spoken with ulterior motive: to rouse 
some of the emotions mentioned above in their Spartan audience? Or, perhaps 
more likely, are they Thucydides’ own views – and if so do they reflect his pride 
as an Athenian, or his dismay at the impetuosity of his fellow-citizens; or should 
they merely be read as part of his narrative technique, his explanation for the 
causes of so much that follows? Again, these questions cannot be answered from 
studying just one passage, but careful reading of Thucydides’ text will uncover 
many more.2 
 
ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ µέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. ἢν δ’ ἄρα του καὶ πείρᾳ σφαλῶσιν, 
ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν· µόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁµοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν 
ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν. καὶ ταῦτα µετὰ 
πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι’ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος µοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα 
τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ µήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα 
πρᾶξαι ξυµφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγµονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον· ὥστε εἴ τις 
αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ µήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν µήτε τοὺς ἄλλους 
ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι (translation by Jowett 1963, 47f., slightly adapted). 
2 Hornblower 1991, 114 notes parallels to a speech put into the mouth of the Athenian 
statesman Kleon (3.37–8) and an authorial assessment in Thucydides’ own ‘voice’ (8.96), and 
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Unlike many of the other types of evidence so far discussed in this book 
(archaeological, epigraphic, papyrological), literary sources have been signifi-
cantly studied with respect to the emotions, especially in the last twenty years.3 
However, there are methodological problems with relying solely on literary 
sources for the history of Greek emotions: nearly all Greek texts were written by 
educated men of high wealth and/or status; they were frequently written to be read 
only by other such men; and a large proportion were written, or received final 
form, in one city in a brief period – Classical (479–322 BCE) Athens. It is 
possibly for this reason that the majority of research done so far into Greek 
emotions has been philological and cultural (for instance the words and metaphors 
used for anger in Homer; how the expression of shame in the Iliad differs from 
that in tragedy), or philosophical (for instance Aristotle on the socio-psychology 
of emotions; the Stoics on control of the emotions). It has only rarely been 
historical: e.g. the ways real people interacted with each other in various poleis 
and other communities across the ancient Greek world at specific points in time; 
the way emotions change over long periods of time; the way emotions are shaped 
by social tensions and cultural developments. 
Further, attention has generally focused on certain genres (epic, lyric poetry, 
tragedy, and philosophy) that only very indirectly reveal how emotions worked in 
real life, and to a much more limited extent on such genres as historiography, 
oratory, and biography that, under certain conditions, may be a better source of 
information for the part played by emotions in social, political, legal, religious, 
and cultural communication. Many other literary genres, especially outside the 
usual canonical authors, have received almost no attention at all – for instance, 
medical writings, technical treatises, didactic texts, fables, epigrams, satires and 
mimes, literary letters, anthologies, epitomes, commentaries, and fragmentary 
texts of all kinds. It will not be my purpose here to canter through as many such 
texts as possible, covering large amounts of ground skimpily. Rather I will use a 
handful of passages from a selection of genres to consider what sort of historical 




concludes that the above passage must therefore also reflect Thucydides’ own views; he 
describes it as ‘as glowing a tribute as anything which Thucydides puts into the mouth of an 
Athenian speaker and is more effective coming from an enemy.’ 
3 Major monographs and collections in English include: Cairns 1993; Williams 1993; 
Nussbaum 1994; Konstan 1997; Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen 1998; Harris 2001; Konstan 
2001; Nussbaum 2001; Braund and Most 2003; Konstan and Rutter 2003; Sternberg 2005; 
Konstan 2006; Fitzgerald 2007; Graver 2007; Konstan 2010; Munteanu 2011a and 2011b; 
Sanders et al. forthcoming; Sanders forthcoming. 
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2  FICTION 
I start, perhaps perversely, with a non real-life genre – the romantic novel – to see 
what can be gleaned even from such a text.4 At the start of Chariton’s Chaireas 
and Kallirhoe,5 a number of aristocratic suitors are competing to marry Kallirhoe, 
the daughter of a Syracusan general. However Chariton tells us that ‘Eros 
intended to make a match of his own devising’.6 He continues:7 
Eros likes to win and enjoys succeeding against the odds. He looked for his opportunity and 
found it as follows. 
A public festival of Aphrodite took place, and almost all the women went to her temple. 
Kallirhoe had never been out in public before, but her father wanted her to do reverence to the 
goddess, and her mother took her. Just at that time Chaireas was walking home from the 
gymnasium; he was radiant as a star, the flush of exercise blooming on his bright countenance 
like gold on silver. Now, chance would have it that at the corner of a narrow street the two 
walked straight into each other; the god had contrived the meeting so that each should see the 
other. At once they were both smitten with love … beauty had met nobility. 
Chaireas, so stricken, could barely make his way home; he was like a hero mortally wounded 
in battle, too proud to fall but too weak to stand. 
This passage is formulaic (a topos), and has precedents dating back several 
centuries. Here, for instance, is a similar passage from the third-century BCE poet 
Theokritos: 
And when I was come already midway on the road, where Lykon’s is, I saw Delphis and 
Eudamippos walking together. More golden than helichryse were their beards, and their 
breasts brighter far than thou, O Moon, for they had lately left the manly labour of the 
wrestling-school. ... I saw, and madness seized me, and my hapless heart was aflame. My 
 
4 Other examples of non real-life, or fictional, Greek genres include epic (e.g. Homer), tragedy, 
and comedy. 
5 The romantic novel flourished in Greek (and Roman) culture in the first few centuries CE; 
Chariton’s Chaireas and Kallirhoe is one of the earliest surviving, dating from the mid-first 
century (Reardon 1989, 5). 
6 Chariton, Chaireas and Kallirhoe 1.1.3.1–2: ὁ δὲ Ἔρως ζεῦγος ἴδιον ἠθέλησε συµπλέξαι 
(translated by Reardon 1989, 22). 
7 Chariton, Chaireas and Kallirhoe 1.1.4.1–7.4: φιλόνικος δέ ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως καὶ χαίρει τοῖς 
παραδόξοις κατορθώµασιν· ἐζήτησε δὲ τοιόνδε τὸν καιρόν. Ἀφροδίτης ἑορτὴ δηµοτελής, 
καὶ πᾶσαι σχεδὸν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸν νεών. τέως δὲ µὴ προϊοῦσαν τὴν Καλ-
λιρόην προήγαγεν ἡ µήτηρ, Ἔρωτος κελεύσαντος προσκυνῆσαι τὴν θεόν. τότε δὲ 
Χαιρέας ἀπὸ τῶν γυµνασίων ἐβάδιζεν οἴκαδε στίλβων ὥσπερ ἀστήρ· ἐπήνθει γὰρ αὐτοῦ 
τῷ λαµπρῷ τοῦ προσώπου τὸ ἐρύθηµα τῆς παλαίστρας ὥσπερ ἀργύρῳ χρυσός. ἐκ τύχης 
οὖν περί τινα καµπὴν στενοτέραν συναντῶντες περιέπεσον ἀλλήλοις, τοῦ θεοῦ πολιτευ-
σαµένου τήνδε τὴν συνοδίαν ἵνα ἑκάτερος τῷ ἑτέρῳ ὀφθῇ. ταχέως οὖν πάθος ἐρωτικὸν 
ἀντέδωκαν ἀλλήλοις … τοῦ κάλλους τῇ εὐγενείᾳ συνελθόντος. Ὁ µὲν οὖν Χαιρέας 
οἴκαδε µετὰ τοῦ τραύµατος µόλις ἀπῄει καὶ ὥσπερ τις ἀριστεὺς ἐν πολέµῳ τρωθεὶς 
καιρίαν καὶ καταπεσεῖν µὲν αἰδούµενος, στῆναι δὲ µὴ δυνάµενος (translated by Reardon 
1989, 22). 
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looks faded away. No eyes had I thereafter for that show, nor know how I came home again, 
but some parching fever shook me, and ten days and ten nights I lay upon my bed.8 
We should not interpret such passages as being necessarily reflective of real-life 
scenarios, but rather literary narrative devices: a stock ‘love at first sight’ 
scenario.9 
Despite the formulaic nature of the Chaireas and Kallirhoe passage, however, 
it nevertheless suggests several profitable lines of enquiry to the historian of 
emotions. For instance, cult: Eros is the divine son of Aphrodite, but he is also a 
deification of an emotion (erôs = sexual desire). This particular deity is well 
known across the Greek world, at least as far back as the eighth-/seventh-century 
BCE epic poet Hesiod.10 However, other deified emotions are more bounded in 
time and place – for instance the cult of Nemesis in Rhamnous and elsewhere,11 or 
that of Phobos (Fear) at Sparta.12 One historical question is why certain emotions 
were deified at certain places, and/or in certain periods – a question that might be 
answered by a literary author, by commentaries on the text, or perhaps by 
inscriptions of decrees instituting cults or establishing temples. For instance, 
regarding the cult of Phobos at Sparta, the first/second-century CE biographer 
Plutarch tells us that the Spartans13 
pay honours to Fear, not as they do to the powers which they try to avert because they think 
them baleful, but because they believe that fear is the chief support of their civil polity. ... 
And the men of old, in my opinion, did not regard bravery as a lack of fear, but as fear of 
 
8 Theokritos, Idylls 2.76–86: ἤδη δ’ εὖσα µέσαν κατ’ ἀµαξιτόν, ᾇ τὰ Λύκωνος, | εἶδον 
∆έλφιν ὁµοῦ τε καὶ Εὐδάµιππον ἰόντας· | τοῖς δ’ ἦς ξανθοτέρα µὲν ἑλιχρύσοιο γενειάς, 
στήθεα δὲ στίλβοντα πολὺ πλέον ἢ τύ, Σελάνα, | ὡς ἀπὸ γυµνασίοιο καλὸν πόνον ἄρτι 
λιπόντων | …. χὠς ἴδον, ὣς ἐµάνην, ὥς µοι πυρὶ θυµὸς ἰάφθη | δειλαίας, τὸ δὲ κάλλος ἐτά-
κετο. οὐκέτι ποµπᾶς | τήνας ἐφρασάµαν, οὐδ’ ὡς πάλιν οἴκαδ’ ἀπῆνθον | ἔγνων, ἀλλά µέ 
τις καπυρὰ νόσος ἐξεσάλαξεν, | κείµαν δ’ ἐν κλιντῆρι δέκ’ ἄµατα καὶ δέκα νύκτας 
(translated by Gow 1950, 21–23). 
9 On formulaic passages in the Greek novel, and their relationship to similar passages in earlier 
Greek narrative or in oriental novels, see Anderson 1984, 25–42. 
10 Hesiod, Theogony 120 – though associated iconography changes over time. See Most 
forthcoming; Stafford forthcoming. 
11 On Nemesis cults, see Hornum 1993, 6–14. On Rhamnous in particular, see Fortea López 
1994, 24–30; Parker 1996, 154; 2005, 406f. I have not provided a one-word translation for 
Nemesis, as there is no equivalent label in English; nemesis is a righteous indignation that 
leads humans to censure and gods to punish wrathfully; the god Nemesis is often translated 
Retribution, but this does not capture the emotional connotations of the Greek word. 
12 The latter is referred to at Plutarch, Life of Kleomenes 9.1. 
13 Plutarch, Life of Kleomenes 9.1–3: τιµῶσι δὲ τὸν Φόβον οὐχ ὥσπερ οὓς ἀποτρέπονται 
δαίµονας ἡγούµενοι βλαβερόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πολιτείαν µάλιστα συνέχεσθαι φόβῳ νοµί-
ζοντες. ... καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν δέ µοι δοκοῦσιν οὐκ ἀφοβίαν, ἀλλὰ φόβον ψόγου καὶ δέος 
ἀδοξίας οἱ παλαιοὶ νοµίζειν. οἱ γὰρ δειλότατοι πρὸς τοὺς νόµους θαρραλεώτατοι πρὸς 
τοὺς πολεµίους εἰσί, καὶ τὸ παθεῖν ἥκιστα δεδίασιν οἱ µάλιστα φοβούµενοι τὸ κακῶς 
ἀκοῦσαι (translated by Perrin 1921, 67). This passage is consistent with the Spartan ‘mirage’, 
which Cartledge 2002, 45 describes as: ‘the distorted image of what both Spartans and non-
Spartans for various and often mutually inconsistent reasons wanted Sparta to be, to stand for 
and to have accomplished.’ 
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reproach and dread of disgrace. For the men who feel most dread of the laws have most 
courage in facing their enemies; and those shun death least who most fear ill fame.  
The connection between emotions and public/private space is another fruitful line 
of enquiry. Here, Kallirhoe’s chastity and modesty are suggested by her only 
being outdoors to attend a religious festival and chaperoned by her mother;14 
Chaireas’ wholesomeness is suggested by his exercise in the gymnasium. Such an 
encounter would therefore be plausible. In a real-life situation (just as depicted 
here) they would not be allowed to express their emotions, by action, speech, or 
any other sort of flirtation: it would damage Kallirhoe’s reputation to be seen 
conversing with a young man in the street, and give the lie to Chaireas’ supposed 
nobility of character were he to press it upon her. Even fiction can demonstrate 
how place (e.g. assembly, courtroom, religious processions, festivals, within the 
home, at another’s house, in the street, in the agora, at war etc.) has a profound 
influence both on the sensation and expression of emotions, and the social 
acceptability of such expression. The characters’ age, social class, and gender are 
important too: Greeks might expect young people to fall instantly in love, and 
their emotions to be violently felt and incontinently expressed;15 only a wealthy 
youth would have the leisure to attend the gymnasium;16 and Chaireas is notably 
bowled over by a girl, while most Classical Athenian literature might lead us to 
expect erotic feeling and competition for a beautiful boy or a courtesan.17 Age, 
social class, gender, place: all matters that must intimately concern the historian of 
emotions, as any other. 
Another aspect we might consider is the cause of Chaireas’ and Kallirhoe’s 
emotion: in this case, catching sight of each other.18 Greeks of different periods 
were interested in a variety of competing causes for emotions. Aristotle famously 
suggests that anger can be understood psychologically as ‘the appetite for 
returning pain for pain’, or physiologically as ‘a boiling of the blood or warm 
substance surrounding the heart’.19 Competing socio-, psycho-, and physiological 
 
14  Attendance at, and indeed participation in, religious festivals was the one major role women 
played in the public life of most Greek cities – at least in the Classical period when the novel 
is set, though not, perhaps, at the time it was written (see below). 
15  Consider Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.12 1389a3–6: οἱ µὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυµητικοί, καὶ 
οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυµήσωσι. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶµα ἐπιθυµιῶν µάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί 
εἰσι τῇ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης (‘the young are prone to desires and 
inclined to do whatever they desire. Of the desires of the body they are most inclined to 
pursue that relating to sex and they are powerless against this’); 2.13 1389b13–15: οἱ δὲ 
πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκµακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἤθη 
(‘people who are older and more or less past their prime have characters that are for the most 
part the opposite of these’; translated by Kennedy 2007, 149–151). 
16  Fisher 1998 challenges this, at least for Classical Athens, with its unusually democratic socio-
political organisation. 
17  See Davidson 1997, 73–136. 
18  See Cairns 2011, on the role vision plays in arousing erôs. 
19  Aristotle, De anima 1.1 403a30–32: οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστιν· ὁ µὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως ἤ τι 
τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵµατος καὶ θερµοῦ (translated by Smith 1984, 
643). 
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explanations for the causes of the emotions can be found in the writings of 
philosophers and medical writers of all periods, but also (as we see above) in the 
most innocuous of literary text. Ideas went in and out of fashion in ancient 
thought as in modern, and what Greeks believed in different periods and localities 
is a profitable line of enquiry for the historian of emotions. Such ideas are almost 
exclusively expounded in literary sources. 
Many psychologists have noted that it often makes more sense to speak of an 
emotional episode or scenario, than an emotion per se.20 Emotional episodes 
begin with ‘antecedent conditions’, which have been well defined as ‘the elements 
physically or objectively present in a situation, along with the perceptions, inter-
pretations, and appraisals of them’;21 these arouse psychological and physiological 
feelings (frequently confused by laypersons with the ‘emotion’ itself); attempts to 
regulate or cope with the emotion may follow; then verbal expressions and/or 
physical actions resulting from the emotion; and eventually resolution.22 In this 
analysis, Chaireas and Kallirhoe catching sight of each other in the way, place, 
and moment that they do, can be seen as the antecedent condition of their erôs 
episode. Continuing the life-cycle of this episode, we would hope to come to the 
symptoms of the emotion,23 the metaphors, similes, and other imagery used to 
describe it, and its resulting actions. Here Chariton is rather restrained. Plato is 
less so in describing Hippothales’ erôs for the boy Lysis – his symptoms and 
actions include blushing, talking incessantly about Lysis, composing poems and 
prose to him, singing about him, hiding from his beloved, and being in an agony 
of confusion that he might be discovered.24 Even fuller ‘symptomatologies’ are 
found for some emotions.25 
 
20  E.g. Parrott 1991, 4: ‘… an emotional episode is the story of an emotional event, and it seems 
a natural unit of analysis for understanding human emotions.’ 
21  Sharpsteen 1991, 37. 
22  See also Elster 1999, 244–283 and Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 49–78, whose analyses differ in some 
details. 
23  Some medical writers attempt to diagnose and cure emotions, for instance the second-century 
CE physician and philosopher Galen in On the Diagnosis and Care of the Passions of the 
Soul – see Harris 2001, 385–387. Plutarch, Life of Demetrios 38.2–7 and Heliodoros, 
Aithiopika 4.7 provide literary dramatisations of this process, in both cases for erôs. 
24  Plato, Lysis 204c2–d8: Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας πολὺ ἔτι µᾶλλον ἠρυθρίασεν. ὁ οὖν Κτήσιππος, 
Ἀστεῖόν γε, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὅτι ἐρυθριᾷς, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, καὶ ὀκνεῖς εἰπεῖν Σωκράτει τοὔνοµα· ἐὰν 
δ’ οὗτος καὶ σµικρὸν χρόνον συνδιατρίψῃ σοι, παραταθήσεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων θαµὰ 
λέγοντος. ἡµῶν γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἐµπέπληκε Λύσιδος· ἂν µὲν 
δὴ καὶ ὑποπίῃ, εὐµαρία ἡµῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἐξ ὕπνου ἐγροµένοις Λύσιδος οἴεσθαι τοὔνοµα 
ἀκούειν. καὶ ἃ µὲν καταλογάδην διηγεῖται, δεινὰ ὄντα, οὐ πάνυ τι δεινά ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ 
ἐπειδὰν τὰ ποιήµατα ἡµῶν ἐπιχειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράµµατα. καὶ ὅ ἐστιν τού-
των δεινότερον, ὅτι καὶ ᾄδει εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ φωνῇ θαυµασίᾳ, ἣν ἡµᾶς δεῖ ἀκούοντας 
ἀνέχεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἐρωτώµενος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρυθριᾷ. 207b4–6: καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Ἱπποθάλης, 
ἐπειδὴ πλείους ἑώρα ἐφισταµένους, τούτους ἐπηλυγισάµενος προσέστη ᾗ µὴ ᾤετο 
κατόψεσθαι τὸν Λύσιν … 210e5–7: κατιδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀγωνιῶντα καὶ τεθορυβηµένον ὑπὸ 
τῶν λεγοµένων, ἀνεµνήσθην ὅτι καὶ προσεστὼς λανθάνειν τὸν Λύσιν ἐβούλετο. 
25  See e.g. Cairns 2003, 24f. on anger in the Iliad. See also pp. 81–85 in this volume.  
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Chaireas eventually marries Kallirhoe, but one envious rival tells Chaireas 
that his wife is being unfaithful to him. Chaireas believes this:26 
For a long time he lay dumb, unable to speak or raise his eyes from the ground. When he 
managed to find his voice – a small voice, not like his normal one. ... [He follows the rival, 
sees a man admitted to his house, and:] Chaireas could restrain himself no longer and rushed 
in to catch the lover red-handed and kill him. [However, on seeing Kallirhoe:] He could not 
find his voice to revile her; overcome by his anger, he kicked her as she ran to him. Now his 
foot found its mark in the girl’s diaphragm and stopped her breath.  
Again this passage is formulaic – we can compare the late second-century CE 
satirist Lucian’s Dialogues of the Courtesans: 27 
Demophantos was my admirer in those days. ... But one day when he called, I was ‘not at 
home’; I had Kallides the painter with me (he had given me ten drachmas). Well, at the time 
Demophantos said some very rude things, and walked off. However, the days went by, and I 
never sent to him; and at last (finding that Kallides had been with me again) even 
Demophantos began to catch fire, and to get into a passion about it; so one day he stood 
outside, and waited till he found the door open: my dear, I don't know what he didn't do! 
cried, beat me, vowed he would murder me, tore my clothes dreadfully!  
In the Chariton passage we again see many psychological and physiological 
symptoms, and resulting actions, but of what emotion? The rival tells us earlier 
that his intention was to ‘set Jealousy (zêlotypia) in arms against [Chaireas]’,28 
and Chariton in his own voice suggests Chaireas could have pleaded jealousy in 
his defence.29 This Greek word zêlotypia highlights a further concern of historians 
of emotions: the lexical and psychological overlap between ancient Greek and our 
own emotion words, in terms both of what they signify (the scenarios in which 
they occur, and the verbal expressions and physical actions they lead to), and also 
their change in meaning over time. Zêlotypia (or rather the adjective zêlotypos) 
first occurs in surviving literature in Aristophanes’ comedy Ploutos (Wealth, 
dated 388 BCE), and David Konstan has argued not only that it did not at that 
stage mean sexual jealousy, but also that sexual jealousy as we understand it may 
 
26  Chariton, Chaireas and Kallirhoe 1.4.7.1–3: Ἐπὶ πολὺ µὲν οὖν ἀχανὴς ἔκειτο, µήτε τὸ 
στόµα µήτε τοὺς ὀφθαλµοὺς ἐπᾶραι δυνάµενος· ἐπεὶ δὲ φωνὴν οὐχ ὁµοίαν µὲν ὀλίγην δὲ 
συνελέξατο; 10.3–4: Χαιρέας οὐκέτι κατέσχεν ἀλλὰ εἰσέδραµεν ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ τὸν 
µοιχὸν ἀναιρήσων; 12.1–4: ὁ δὲ φωνὴν µὲν οὐκ ἔσχεν ὥστε λοιδορήσασθαι, κρατούµενος 
δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ἐλάκτισε προσιοῦσαν. εὐστόχως οὖν ὁ ποὺς κατὰ τοῦ διαφράγµατος 
ἐνεχθεὶς ἐπέσχε τῆς παιδὸς τὴν ἀναπνοήν (translated by Reardon 1989, 26f.). 
27  Lucian, Dialogi meretricii 8.300.10–25: ἤρα µου ∆ηµόφαντος. ... ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλθόντα ποτὲ 
ἀπέκλεισα — Καλλίδης γὰρ ὁ γραφεὺς ἔνδον ἦν δέκα δραχµὰς πεποµφώς — τὸ µὲν 
πρῶτον ἀπῆλθέ µοι λοιδορησάµενος· ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλαὶ µὲν διῆλθον ἡµέραι, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ 
προσέπεµπον, ὁ Καλλίδης δὲ ἔνδον ἦν, ὑποθερµαινόµενος ἤδη τότε ὁ ∆ηµόφαντος καὶ 
αὐτὸς ἀναφλέγεται ἐς τὸ πρᾶγµα καὶ ἐπιστάς ποτε ἀνεῳγµένην τηρήσας τὴν θύραν 
ἔκλαεν, ἔτυπτεν, ἠπείλει φονεύσειν, περιερρήγνυε τὴν ἐσθῆτα, ἅπαντα ἐποίει (translated 
by Fowler and Fowler 1905, 63). 
28  Chariton, Chaireas and Kallirhoe 1.2.5.4: ἐφοπλιῶ γὰρ αὐτῷ Ζηλοτυπίαν (translated by 
Reardon 1989, 24). On Chaireas’ jealousy, see Jones 2012, chapter 1. 
29  Chariton, Chaireas and Kallirhoe 1.5.4.6–7: οὐδὲν εἰπὼν τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπολογίαν δικαίων, 
οὐ τὴν διαβολήν, οὐ τὴν ζηλοτυπίαν (translated by Reardon 1989, 28). 
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not even have existed prior to the first century BCE.30 While I have demonstrated 
elsewhere that this latter assertion is invalid,31 it is certainly the case that in the 
Classical period the word zêlotypia implies possessive jealousy or envy/greed, in 
either a sexual context or metaphor, rather than sexual jealousy as in Chariton.32 
Drawing together several strands already referred to, these two Chariton 
passages suggest one final issue: to what extent do fictional genres reflect the 
emotions of real-life historical Greeks, rather than being merely literary topoi? 
And inasmuch as they do, do they reflect the emotions of the time in which they 
are written, or the time at which they are set?33 These are tough questions, and 
most scholarship on ancient emotions in Greek literature does not address them – 
fairly, as they are not questions philologists or philosophers frequently set out to 
answer. However, for historians these questions cannot be ducked. Comparisons 
must be found in other, contemporary genres – for instance fifth-century tragedy 
with Thucydides or Old Comedy (more tentatively with fifth-/fourth-century 
oratory); alternatively in authors of the period in which it is set – for Chariton, 
perhaps Thucydides or Xenophon. Non-literary media can also be extremely 
helpful: love stories and rivalries, sexual jealousies, and actions causing harm 
abound in letters found on papyri, for instance; curse tablets may be helpful too, 
as may epigrams.34 
3  ‘HISTORICAL’ GENRES: ORATORY, BIOGRAPHY, HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Amongst literary genres, oratory is unique in that it both reflects real life, and 
addresses a mass audience, thus providing excellent evidence for the values of a 
community. Tragedy and comedy (and arguably epic) address mass audiences, but 
are fictional genres. Historiography and biography purport to record real-life 
events, but are written for an unrepresentative audience (educated males of 
superior class/wealth). Of literary genres that purport to record real life, oratory 
must uniquely be credible to an audience of broad social and educational 
background (though still entirely of citizen males). It is for this reason that I have 
chosen to concentrate on oratory in my case study later in this volume (pp. 355–
383). 
 
30  Konstan 2006, 219–243. 
31  Sanders forthcoming, chapter 8. 
32  Possessive jealousy: Aristophanes, Ploutos 1016; Plato, Symposium 213d2; Aeschines 1.58.4: 
Menander, Perikeiromene 987. Envy/greed: Aeschines 3.81.7; Aeschines 3.211.10; Isocrates 
15.245.3. NB envy in a sexual context is the feeling I have for someone who has a beautiful 
girlfriend; sexual jealousy is my feeling at his dating Jane Smith, with whom I myself am in 
love (and believe previously reciprocated). See Salovey and Rodin 1986 on this distinction 
between what they label ‘social-comparison jealousy’ and ‘romantic jealousy’. 
33  E.g. the first-century CE Chaireas and Kallirhoe uses zêlotypia anachronistically for its 
fourth-century BCE setting (see above). 
34  For epigrams evoking physical intimacy between husband and wife, see p. 103 in this 
volume; for a curse tablet showing jealousy, see pp. 85f. 
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Let us consider a passage of Lysias’ speech Against Simon, in which he 
portrays a defendant’s character:35 
I am particularly upset, members of the Council, at being forced to speak about matters like 
this in front of you. I put up with mistreatment, because I was ashamed at the prospect of 
many people knowing all about me. ... But if I can show I am not guilty of any of the charges 
that Simon has stated on oath, even though it is obvious that I have behaved rather foolishly 
towards the young man, given my age, I shall ask you to think no worse of me. You know 
that desire affects everybody and that the most honorable and restrained man is the one who 
can bear his troubles most discreetly.  
As with the Chariton passages in the previous section, we can note once again the 
influence of age, social class, and gender on emotions. Unlike Chaireas, the 
speaker in Against Simon is a mature man, and (as he himself admits) erôs is 
considered somewhat unusual at his time of life.36 The object of his passion is a 
teenage boy, possibly a slave,37 while he himself is wealthy enough to afford a 
speech-writer (and a prostitute as companion, if that is what the young man is), 
and to leave the city at will – i.e. he is of the leisured classes. Yet he must 
persuade a jury, which will mostly be made up of poorer citizens, for whom 
indulging in love affairs with young male prostitutes will be an alien experience. 
Age, gender, and social class will have an effect not just on the speaker’s 
emotions, but also on how he can best portray those emotions. 
Orators use emotions as a persuasion strategy in two principal ways. First, 
through narrative. The speaker can describe his own emotions, in a way that is 
designed to demonstrate his innocence or show his good character – here, his 
erôs, shame at inappropriate sexual desire, and upset at being forced to make it 
public (all of which may be faked). Alternatively, he can accuse his opponent of 
being motivated by baser emotions – as in the following passage from the same 
speech, where the speaker portrays his opponent as driven by jealousy:38 
 
35  Lysias 3.3–4: µάλιστα δ’ ἀγανακτῶ, ὦ βουλή, ὅτι περὶ τῶν πραγµάτων εἰπεῖν 
ἀναγκασθήσοµαι πρὸς ὑµᾶς, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγὼ αἰσχυνόµενος, εἰ µέλλοιεν πολλοί µοι 
συνείσεσθαι, ἠνεσχόµην ἀδικούµενος. ... ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀποδείξω ὡς οὐκ ἔνοχός 
εἰµι οἷς Σίµων διωµόσατο, ἄλλως δὲ ὑµῖν φαίνωµαι παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐµαυτοῦ ἀνοη-
τότερον πρὸς τὸ µειράκιον διατεθείς, αἰτοῦµαι ὑµᾶς µηδέν µε χείρω νοµίζειν, εἰδότας ὅτι 
ἐπιθυµῆσαι µὲν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἔνεστιν, οὗτος δὲ βέλτιστος ἂν εἴη καὶ σωφρο-
νέστατος, ὅστις κοσµιώτατα τὰς συµφορὰς φέρειν δύναται (translated by Todd 2000, 
44f.). Lysias lived in Athens as a resident alien in the late fifth/early fourth centuries BCE, 
and wrote speeches (almost entirely) for delivery by others in trials. 
36  The speaker seems embarrassed: he says he did not want to appear rather foolish, pursuing an 
erotic relationship with a young lad at his time of life (3.4: ἄλλως δὲ ὑµῖν φαίνωµαι παρὰ 
τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐµαυτοῦ ἀνοητότερον πρὸς τὸ µειράκιον διατιθείς) – cf. note 15 above. 
Todd 2007, 278 notes that the speaker ‘appears to be unmarried at an age when this was 
evidently unusual’. The fourth/third-century BCE comic playwright Menander portrays a 
mature man similarly ashamed of a relationship with a courtesan at Samia 23, 27 – see Lape 
2004, 139f. 
37  Carey 1989, 87 believes that he is; Todd 2000, 43 believes that he is not. 
38  Lysias 3.5–8: Ἡµεῖς γὰρ ἐπεθυµήσαµεν, ὦ βουλή, Θεοδότου, Πλαταϊκοῦ µειρακίου. ... 
πυθόµενος γὰρ ὅτι τὸ µειράκιον ἦν παρ’ ἐµοί, ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐµὴν νύκτωρ 
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We were both attracted, members of the Council, to Theodotos, a young man from Plataia. ... 
He found out that the young man was staying with me, and came to my house drunk one 
night. He knocked down the doors and made his way into the women’s rooms, where my 
sister and my nieces were – women who have been brought up so respectably that they are 
ashamed to be seen even by relatives. Simon, however, reached such a level of arrogance that 
he refused to leave, until the men who were present, together with those who had 
accompanied him, realized that by entering the rooms of young orphaned girls he was 
behaving unacceptably, and threw him out by force. Far from apologizing for this outrageous 
conduct, he found out where I was having dinner and did something that was extraordinary 
and (unless you know his criminal insanity) unbelievable. He called me out of the house, and 
as soon as I came out, he immediately tried to hit me. I defended myself, so he moved off and 
threw stones at me.  
The second use of emotions in oratory is to arouse the audience’s emotions: their 
sympathy or pity (as in the first passage above), friendship, gratitude, or other 
kindly emotions for the speaker; or their anger or indignation (as in the second 
passage), hatred, envy, resentment, or other hostile emotions for the opponent.39 
This emotion arousal can be achieved in a variety of ways. One possibility is 
explicitly, through exhortation – there are hundreds of explicit calls for an 
audience’s emotional response in Classical Athenian oratory, for instance (from 
the end of the same speech):40 
So I rightly deserve pity from you and from others, not only if I should suffer the fate that 
Simon intends but simply because I have been compelled by these events to undergo such a 
trial.  
Alternatively orators can arouse an audience’s emotions covertly, by playing on 
their values – in the first two passages above, the audience’s sympathy/pity is 
roused for the speaker for the travails he has suffered and his embarrassment, and 
their indignation/anger against the opponent by his violence against the speaker 
and outrageous behaviour towards the female relatives (see pp. 357–359 on covert 
arousal of emotions). A final way an audience’s emotions can be aroused is 
through theatrical effects – that is, delivery. Here, for instance, is an account of a 
 
µεθύων, ἐκκόψας τὰς θύρας εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν, ἔνδον οὐσῶν τῆς τε ἀδελφῆς 
τῆς ἐµῆς καὶ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν, αἳ οὕτω κοσµίως βεβιώκασιν ὥστε καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων 
ὁρώµεναι αἰσχύνεσθαι. οὗτος τοίνυν εἰς τοῦτο ἦλθεν ὕβρεως ὥστ’ οὐ πρότερον ἠθέλησεν 
ἀπελθεῖν, πρὶν αὐτὸν ἡγούµενοι δεινὰ ποιεῖν οἱ παραγενόµενοι καὶ οἱ µετ’ αὐτοῦ ἐλθόν-
τες, ἐπὶ παῖδας κόρας καὶ ὀρφανὰς εἰσιόντα, ἐξήλασαν βίᾳ. καὶ τοσούτου ἐδέησεν αὐτῷ 
µεταµελῆσαι τῶν ὑβρισµένων, ὥστε ἐξευρὼν οὗ ἐδειπνοῦµεν ἀτοπώτατον πρᾶγµα καὶ 
ἀπιστότατον ἐποίησεν, εἰ µή τις εἰδείη τὴν τούτου µανίαν. ἐκκαλέσας γάρ µε ἔνδοθεν, 
ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ἐξῆλθον, εὐθύς µε τύπτειν ἐπεχείρησεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτὸν ἠµυνάµην, 
ἐκστὰς ἔβαλλέ µε λίθοις (translated by Todd 2000, 45). For other examples of such detailed, 
vivid descriptions (enargeia), see other studies in this volume: pp. 63 and 76–79 (petitions in 
papyri), 102f. (funerary epigrams), and 188f. (healing miracles of Epidauros). 
39  Arousal of the audience’s emotions is particularly recommended by Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.2 
1356a14–20 and 2.1–11 1378a19–1388b30, and [Aristotle], Rhetoric to Alexander 34 
1439b15–1440b4. 
40  Lysias 3.48: ὥστε δικαίως ἂν ὑφ’ ὑµῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεηθείην, οὐ µόνον εἴ τι 
πάθοιµι ὧν Σίµων βούλεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἠναγκάσθην ἐκ τοιούτων πραγµάτων εἰς 
τοιούτους ἀγῶνας καταστῆναι (translated by Todd 2000, 52). 
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speech to the Assembly in the Sicilian city of Engyion in the late third century 
BCE, described by Plutarch:41 
Nikias, right in the midst of some advice that he was giving to the people, suddenly threw 
himself upon the ground, and after a little while, amid the silence and consternation which 
naturally prevailed, lifted his head, turned it about, and spoke in a low and trembling voice, 
little by little raising and sharpening its tones. And when he saw the whole audience struck 
dumb with horror, he tore off his mantle, rent his tunic, and leaping up half naked, ran 
towards the exit from the theatre, crying out that he was pursued by the Mothers [goddesses]. 
No man venturing to lay hands upon him or even to come in his way, out of superstitious fear, 
but all avoiding him, he ran out to the gate of the city, freely using all the cries and gestures 
that would become a man possessed and crazed.  
This passage leads me to another historical genre, biography, and a different type 
of text. Plutarch informs us in his Life of Agis about the reasons for, and effects of, 
a fourth-/third-century BCE law change in Sparta:42 
But when a certain powerful man came to be ephor who was headstrong and of a violent 
temper, Epitadeus by name, he had a quarrel with his son, and introduced a law permitting a 
man during his lifetime to give his estate and allotment to any one he wished, or in his will 
and testament so to leave it. This man, then, satisfied a private grudge of his own in 
introducing the law; but his fellow citizens welcomed the law out of greed, made it valid, and 
so destroyed the most excellent of institutions. For the men of power and influence at once 
began to acquire estates without scruple, ejecting the rightful heirs from their inheritances; 
and speedily the wealth of the state streamed into the hands of a few men, and poverty 
became the general rule, bringing in its train lack of leisure for noble pursuits and occupations 
unworthy of freemen, along with envy and hatred towards the men of property.  
In this passage we see emotions (explicitly grudging, greed, envy, and hatred; 
implicitly anger) interacting with property ownership, laws to promote equalisa-
tion (or otherwise) of property, the relationship between rich and poor, and the 
 
41  Plutarch, Life of Marcellus 20.5–6: ὁ δὲ Νικίας µεταξύ τι λέγων καὶ συµβουλεύων πρὸς 
τὸν δῆµον, ἐξαίφνης ἀφῆκεν εἰς τὴν γῆν τὸ σῶµα, καὶ µικρὸν διαλιπών, οἷον εἰκὸς ἡσυ-
χίας σὺν ἐκπλήξει γενοµένης, τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπάρας καὶ περιενεγκὼν ὑποτρόµῳ φωνῇ καὶ 
βαρείᾳ, κατὰ µικρὸν συντείνων καὶ παροξύνων τὸν ἦχον, ὡς ἑώρα φρίκῃ καὶ σιωπῇ 
κατεχόµενον τὸ θέατρον, ἀπορρίψας τὸ ἱµάτιον καὶ περιρρηξάµενος τὸν χιτωνίσκον, 
ἡµίγυµνος ἀναπηδήσας ἔθεε πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον τοῦ θεάτρου, βοῶν ὑπὸ τῶν Ματέρων 
ἐλαύνεσθαι, καὶ µηδενὸς τολµῶντος ἅψασθαι µηδ’ ἀπαντῆσαι διὰ δεισιδαιµονίαν, ἀλλ’ 
ἐκτρεποµένων, ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας ἐξέδραµεν, οὔτε φωνῆς τινος οὔτε κινήσεως πρεπούσης 
δαιµονῶντι καὶ παραφρονοῦντι φεισάµενος (translated by Perrin 1917, 491). See Chaniotis 
1997, 234f. and forthcoming. Plutarch relies on earlier sources – here the first-century BCE 
historian Poseidonios (FgrH 87 F 43). 
42  Plutarch, Life of Agis 5.2–3: ἐφορεύσας δέ τις ἀνὴρ δυνατός, αὐθάδης δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸς τὸν 
τρόπον, Ἐπιτάδευς ὄνοµα, πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῷ γενοµένης διαφορᾶς, ῥήτραν ἔγραψεν 
ἐξεῖναι τὸν οἶκον αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸν κλῆρον ᾧ τις ἐθέλοι καὶ ζῶντα δοῦναι καὶ καταλιπεῖν 
διατιθέµενον. οὗτος µὲν οὖν αὑτοῦ τινα θυµὸν ἀποπιµπλὰς ἴδιον εἰσήνεγκε τὸν νόµον· οἱ 
δ’ ἄλλοι πλεονεξίας ἕνεκα δεξάµενοι καὶ κυρώσαντες, ἀπώλεσαν τὴν ἀρίστην κατά-
στασιν. ἐκτῶντο γὰρ ἀφειδῶς ἤδη παρωθοῦντες οἱ δυνατοὶ τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐκ τῶν 
διαδοχῶν, καὶ ταχὺ τῆς εὐπορίας εἰς ὀλίγους συρρυείσης, πενία τὴν πόλιν κατέσχεν, 
ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἀσχολίαν ἐπιφέρουσα µετὰ φθόνου καὶ δυσµενείας πρὸς 
τοὺς ἔχοντας (translated by Perrin 1921, 13–15). 
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stability or otherwise of the polity – the socio-political effects of this law, accord-
ing to Plutarch, creating the conditions for revolution. Such issues are staples of 
Greek historiography, as well as other political writings.43 Aristotle, for instance, 
tells us that 
those who have secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, 
or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of their 
greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are 
unwilling to remain on a level with others.44 
Likewise, Thucydides, following a description of horrific civil strife in the polis of 
Kerkyra:45 
Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all 
these evils. To this must be added the violent fanaticism which came into play once the 
struggle had broken out. ... As for those citizens who held moderate views, they were 
destroyed by both the extreme parties, either for not taking part in the struggle or in envy at 
the possibility that they might survive.  
The extent to which Greek historians, biographers, orators, philosophers etc. 
ascribed such issues (and others) to emotional motivations, is clearly a major 
subject for investigation.46 We might also consider to what extent emotions are 
postulated, as in the Agis passage above, as a rationale for something whose true 
origins are lost in the mists of time. 
A second area for study suggested by this passage is the connections Greeks 
believed there were between emotions – for instance, how one emotion leads to 
another, and under what circumstances. In the passage above, private anger and 
grudging mingles with generalised greed, leading to widespread envy and hatred. 
Aristotle suggests a different sort of connection, when he opines that those 
(jurors) feeling indignation or envy will be incapable of feeling pity.47 The fourth-
century BCE historian/moralist Xenophon unites both these issues (emotions in 
 
43  E.g. see Ehrenberg 1938, 52–61 on pothos (yearning/longing/desire) as a frequent explanation 
of Alexander the Great’s actions in ancient historiography. Until recently, modern historians 
are considerably less willing to attribute political decisions to emotions. See pp. 12–14 in this 
volume. 
44  Aristotle, Politics 5.4 1304a34–38: ὡς οἱ δυνάµεως αἴτιοι γενόµενοι, καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ 
ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως µέρος καὶ πλῆθος ὁποιονοῦν, στάσιν κινοῦσιν· ἢ γὰρ οἱ τού-
τοις φθονοῦντες τιµωµένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι 
µένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων (translated by Jowett 1984, 2071). 
45  Thucydides 3.82.8: πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιµίαν· ἐκ δ’ 
αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταµένων τὸ πρόθυµον. ... τὰ δὲ µέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ 
ἀµφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο (translated by 
Warner 1954, 243f.). Hornblower 1991, 485 comments that: ‘These motives – love of power, 
greed, ambition – were all of the greatest importance for Th.’, and provides comparative 
passages elsewhere in the History. 
46  E.g. see Harrison 2003 on envy as a cause in the Histories of the fifth-century BCE historian 
Herodotus. We might also compare inscriptions mentioning phthonos (envy), of which there 
are many. 
47  Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.9 1387a3–5: διὸ κωλυτικὰ µὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτ’ ἐστί, διαφέρει δὲ 
διὰ τὰς εἰρηµένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ µὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν ἅπαντα ὁµοίως χρήσιµα. 
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their socio-political setting, and the relationships between emotions) in his 
description of how friendship changes one’s emotions and actions:48 
By nature human beings have certain tendencies towards friendliness. They need one another, 
they feel pity, they benefit from cooperation and, realizing this, they are grateful to one 
another. They also have hostile tendencies. When they have the same opinions about what 
things are beautiful and pleasant, they fight for their possession, and, falling out, take sides. 
Rivalry and passion also make for hostility; the desire to overreach is a cause of ill-feeling, 
and envy arouses hatred. Nevertheless, friendliness finds a way through all these obstacles 
and unites men who are truly good. Their moral goodness makes them prefer to enjoy 
moderate possessions and avoid tribulation rather than gain absolute power by means of war, 
and enables them, when hungry and thirsty, to share their food and drink without a pang, and 
to control their pleasure in the sexual attraction of beauty in such a way as not to cause 
improper annoyance to anyone. It enables them not only to suppress greedy instincts and be 
content with a lawful share of wealth, but even to assist one another. It enables them to settle 
arguments not only without annoyance, but even to their mutual advantage, and to keep their 
tempers from rising to a degree that they will later regret. It rids them completely of envy, 
since they give their own goods into the possession of their friends, and regard their friends’ 
property as their own.  
Returning to the Plutarch Life of Agis passage above, another issue that will be 
familiar to historians is what we might refer to as commentator bias: how far can 
authors who are rich, educated, and (frequently, though not here) Athenian, be 
believed when they opine on the emotional motivations of those who are poor, 
uneducated, and/or non-Athenian – or even non-Greek? To what extent are 
‘Greek’ emotions themselves Athenian cultural constructs? For instance, 
discussion of phthonos (envy/possessive jealousy) in so many Classical (479–322 
BCE) sources – which are overwhelmingly Atheno-centric – is so intimately 
bound up with class and wealth issues in democratic Athens that it raises 
legitimate questions as to how appropriate any understanding drawn from them 
will be to non-Athenian contexts.49 
 
48 Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.6.21.2–23.7: φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ µὲν φιλικά· 
δέονταί τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλεοῦσι καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες 
χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τὰ δὲ πολεµικά· τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νοµίζοντες ὑπὲρ 
τούτων µάχονται καὶ διχογνωµονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεµικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· 
καὶ δυσµενὲς µὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, µισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος. ἀλλ’ ὅµως διὰ τούτων 
πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυοµένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν 
αἱροῦνται µὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ µέτρια κεκτῆσθαι µᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολέµου πάντων κυριεύ-
ειν, καὶ δύνανται πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν καὶ τοῖς 
τῶν ὡραίων ἀφροδισίοις ἡδόµενοι καρτερεῖν, ὥστε µὴ λυπεῖν οὓς µὴ προσήκει· δύνανται 
δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔριν οὐ µόνον ἀλύπως, ἀλλὰ καὶ συµφερόντως ἀλλήλοις διατίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν 
ὀργὴν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ µεταµελησόµενον προϊέναι· τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι, 
τὰ µὲν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νοµίζοντες 
(translated by Tredennick and Waterfield 1990, 123). 
49  To take one example, we might wonder at its relationship to an envious (phthoneros) god 
causing someone’s death, a cause which has been frequently attested in funerary inscriptions 
– for examples see Vérilhac 1978, 100f. no. 66, 257 no. 180; Lattimore 1942, 148f., also 147 
for baskania and 153f. for invidia (‘envious glance’ in, respectively, Greek and Latin) doing 
likewise. 
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Finally, one more issue familiar from historiography can be raised here: that 
of reporting. Plutarch bases much of his Life of Agis on the writings of historians 
of the Hellenistic period (322–31 BCE), and an exaggerated emotionality was 
supposedly one of the hallmarks of writing in this period. The second-century 
BCE historian Polybios criticises the third-century BCE historian Phylarchos for 
this tendency:50 
Exercising in this case too his peculiar talent, the author gives us a made-up story of his cries 
when on the rack having reached the ears of the neighbours during the night, some of whom, 
horrified at the crime, others scarcely crediting their senses and others in hot indignation ran 
to the house. About Phylarchus’ vice of sensationalism I need say no more, for I have given 
sufficient evidence of it.  
Plutarch, like any commentator separated by time from the events he describes, 
can only be as good as his own sources – and undated, unreferenced anecdotes 
about private emotional motivations must be treated with caution.51 Like other 
historians, the historian of emotions must test sources for plausibility, and for their 
wider applicability. 
4  BEYOND THE USUAL SUSPECTS: OTHER HISTORICAL SOURCES 
At this point it is perhaps appropriate, then, to turn to a fragment of a text by 
Phylarchos himself, preserved in Athenaios’ Deipnosophistai:52 
Phylarchos says that the Athenian settlers in Lemnos were flatterers. For the Athenians in 
Lemnos – showing gratitude to the descendants of Seleukos and Antiochos, because Seleukos 
not only delivered them when they were severely oppressed by Lysimachos, but also restored 
both their cities to them – not only erected temples to Seleukos, but also to his son Antiochos; 
 
50  Polybios 2.59.2: τηρῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν ὁ συγγραφεὺς τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸν 
ἰδίωµα φωνάς τινας πλάττει διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοῦ στρεβλουµένου προσπιπτούσας τοῖς 
σύνεγγυς κατοικοῦσιν, ὧν τοὺς µὲν ἐκπληττοµένους τὴν ἀσέβειαν, τοὺς δ’ ἀπιστοῦντας, 
τοὺς δ’ ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς γινοµένοις προστρέχειν πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν φησίν. περὶ µὲν 
οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης τερατείας παρείσθω· δεδήλωται γὰρ ἀρκούντως (translated by Paton, 
Walbank, and Habicht 2010, 425). Cf. Polybios 2.56.7–8. On so-called ‘tragic historiography’ 
see Walbank 1960; for further bibliography on Polybios’ criticism of tragic historiography, 
see Chaniotis 1997, 221 note 14; Schepens 2004; van der Stockt 2004; Marincola 2010. 
51  On Plutarch’s sources and reliability, see Pelling 2000, 44–60. 
52  The Deipnosophistai is an invaluable late second-/early third-century CE compendium of 
excerpts from earlier literary and historical sources, organised by subject; it takes the form of 
a report of a dinner-party discussion between a large number of educated men. Phylarchos 
FgrH 81F29 (at Athenaios, Deipnosophistai 6.66.254f–255a): κόλακας δ’ εἶναί φησι 
Φύλαρχος καὶ τοὺς ἐν Λήµνῳ κατοικοῦντας Ἀθηναίων. ... χάριν γὰρ ἀποδιδόντας τοῖς 
Σελεύκου καὶ Ἀντιόχου ἀπογόνοις, ἐπεὶ αὐτοὺς ὁ Σέλευκος πικρῶς ἐπιστατουµένους ὑπὸ 
Λυσιµάχου οὐ µόνον ἐξείλετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς πόλεις αὐτοῖς ἀπέδωκεν ἀµφοτέρας, οἱ Λη-
µνόθεν Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ µόνον ναοὺς κατεσκεύασαν τοῦ Σελεύκου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ 
Ἀντιόχου· καὶ τὸν ἐπιχεόµενον κύαθον ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις Σελεύκου σωτῆρος καλοῦσι 
(translated by Yonge 1854, 400, slightly modified). For a similar decree instituting cult 
worship of Seleukos and Antiochos in the polis of Aigai, see Ricl and Malay 2009. 
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and at their feasts, the cup which they use for libations they call ‘the cup of Seleukos the 
Saviour’. 
It had long been customary to express gratitude to a foreign benefactor by the 
granting of honours.53 Since Alexander (336–323 BCE) in particular – although 
there are earlier precedents – this expression of gratitude began to include the 
local establishment of cults, in which the benefactor was worshipped as a 
divinity.54 The fullest extent of their development was not immediate, however, 
and this excerpt of Phylarchos provides evidence for an inflation in cultic 
honours.55 The Athenians surpass customary gratitude in a number of ways (hence 
why Phylarchos terms this flattery): by establishing a cult to the king’s son as well 
as to the king himself; by binding future generations to continue to express 
gratitude; by erecting temples;56 and by pouring libations at banquets – this act of 
worship in private homes assimilating both kings to the level of gods.57 Since 
canonical literary evidence for this period is extremely limited (chiefly Polybios 
and Plutarch, both working from earlier sources), much of the literary evidence 
available for the development of such cults will only be found in fragmentary 
texts. 
This particular fragment was preserved in an anthology (see note 52 above), 
and such anthologies are useful, if rarely used, historical sources. Another type of 
source rarely used is educative literature. One tract, addressed by the fourth-
century BCE educator Isocrates to the young ruler Demonikos, contains the 
following instruction on the moral virtues of shame:58 
 
53  Among literary texts, Demosthenes 20 and 23 evidence a lively discussion on the topic in 
fourth-century BCE Athens. See Austin 2006, 320f. no. 175 for an example of an inscription 
(dated in the 240s BCE) in which Seleukos II of Syria acknowledges the gratitude of the city 
of Miletos for his and his ancestors’ benefactions. 
54  Habicht 1970 is the seminal work on these so-called ‘ruler cults’ established by poleis in the 
Hellenistic period (323–31 BCE). For recent discussions of ruler cults, including their 
historical development, see Chaniotis 2003; Buraselis and Aneziri 2004; Chaniotis 2007 (on 
gratitude and memory in the ruler cult); Chankowski 2010. The cults in the cities should be 
distinguished from the cults that were established centrally by the major dynasties – see van 
Nuffelen 2004 on the royal cult of the Seleucid kings of Syria; Melaerts 1998 on the dynastic 
Ptolemaic cult in Egypt. 
55  On this specific cult, see Habicht 1970, 89f. 
56  Chaniotis 2003, 438f. notes that this is a rare example of an entire temple being erected to a 
ruler, an altar in a sacred precinct normally sufficing. 
57  On private worship of Hellenistic monarchs, see Aneziri 2005; for Ptolemaic monarchs, see 
Pfeiffer 2008. 
58  Isocrates 1.15.4–5: Ἃ ποιεῖν αἰσχρὸν, ταῦτα νόµιζε µηδὲ λέγειν εἶναι καλόν. 1.15.7–16.2: 
Ἡγοῦ µάλιστα σεαυτῷ πρέπειν κόσµον αἰσχύνην, δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην· τούτοις 
γὰρ ἅπασιν δοκεῖ κρατεῖσθαι τὸ τῶν νεωτέρων ἦθος. Μηδέποτε µηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιήσας 
ἔλπιζε λήσειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους λάθῃς, σεαυτῷ συνειδήσεις. 1.21.2–4: Ὑφ’ ὧν 
κρατεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν αἰσχρὸν, τούτων ἐγκράτειαν ἄσκει πάντων, κέρδους, ὀργῆς, 
ἡδονῆς, λύπης. 1.21.10–11: αἰσχρὸν ὑπολάβῃς τῶν µὲν οἰκετῶν ἄρχειν, ταῖς δ’ ἡδοναῖς 
δουλεύειν. 1.24.4–7: Βραδέως µὲν φίλος γίγνου, γενόµενος δὲ πειρῶ διαµένειν. Ὁµοίως 
γὰρ αἰσχρὸν µηδένα φίλον ἔχειν καὶ πολλοὺς ἑταίρους µεταλλάττειν. 1.26.1–3: Ὁµοίως 
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Believe that what is shameful to do is not good even to mention.  
Think that a sense of shame and justice and soundness of mind are an especially fitting 
regimen, for all agree that the character of the young should be controlled by these things. 
Never expect to do something shameful and get away with it; for although you may escape 
the notice of others, you will be conscious of it yourself. 
Strengthen your soul against all those things by which it is shameful for it to be overcome, 
such as profit, anger, pleasure, and pain. 
It is shameful to rule servants and yet to be a slave to pleasures… 
Be slow to take on a friendship, but once you have, try to maintain it, for it is equally 
shameful to have no friends and to be continually changing companions. 
Regard it a similar disgrace to be outdone by your enemies in doing harm and to be beaten by 
your friends in doing good. 
This passage shows the thoughts of a conservative, Athenian philosopher/educator 
on the appropriate uses of a healthy capacity for shame (aidôs/aischynê), especial-
ly in training the young. It demonstrates that this particular individual was well 
aware of the educative value of the emotion.59 His comments, however, also re-
flect ‘traditional’ thought – many ideas that appear in later educative tracts were 
attributed to earlier moralists such as the ‘Seven Sages’ of the Archaic period 
(seventh/sixth centuries BCE) or can be traced back to the poems the sixth-/fifth-
century BCE conservative aristocrat Theognis purportedly wrote to his young 
beloved Kyrnos – historical sources that are often ignored. Consider, for example 
the following verses:60 
You will lay by no greater treasure for your sons than a sense of shame, Kyrnos, which 
follows good men. 
Kyrnos, feel shame before [i.e. respect] and fear the gods – for this prevents a man from 
doing harm or speaking impiously. 
Such thoughts can be traced forwards in time too, and we might expect similar 
comments to appear in such works as Plutarch’s Moralia, Stobaeus’ Anthology,61 
or the Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum (Corpus of Greek Proverbs). Such 
texts have never yet been consistently studied in connection with the history of 
emotions, but they will both trace patterns of thought that persist over a thousand 
years of Greek moralising, and help highlight similarities and differences between 
different geographical locations. For instance Plutarch records one anecdote in 
which a character says: 
 
αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νόµιζε τῶν ἐχθρῶν νικᾶσθαι ταῖς κακοποιίαις καὶ τῶν φίλων ἡττᾶσθαι 
ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις (translated by Mirhady 2000, 22–25). 
59  Kristjánnson 2007, 99–112 argues that for Aristotle emulation was the primary educative 
emotion; for a contrary view see Sanders 2008, 272–274, where I argue that Aristotle sees 
education in virtue as involving all the emotions. 
60  Theognis 409f.: Οὐδένα θησαυρὸν παισὶν καταθήσει ἀµείνω αἰδοῦς, ἥτ’ ἀγαθοῖσ’ 
ἀνδράσι, Κύρν’, ἕπεται; 1179f.: Κύρνε, θεοὺς αἰδοῦ καὶ δείδιθι· τοῦτο γὰρ ἄνδρα εἴργει 
µήθ’ ἕρδειν µήτε λέγειν ἀσεβῆ (my translation). 
61  Of which, for instance, 3.31–32 in particular deals with aidôs. The Anthology was probably 
compiled in the fifth century CE. 
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In Sparta ..., wealth, softness, and adorning oneself are held in no honour, while a sense of 
shame, good conduct, and persuasion of the leaders are prioritised.62 
This is both excellent historical evidence for Spartan thought about shame,63 and 
an indication that they too believed it could/should be taught: consider what it is 
grouped with. 
Finally, I wish to discuss briefly one more type of source that has never been 
systematically studied in connection with emotions, and that is the so-called 
scholia.64 This is a vast field, and here I shall select merely a handful of passages 
which cast further light on an emotion I considered earlier: zêlotypia. In the 
Odyssey, the nymph Kalypso responds to Zeus’ reported order to let Odysseus 
(her lover, but also her prisoner) go free:65 
You are cruel, gods, zêlêmones beyond all others, who resent (agaasthe) goddesses sleeping 
beside men publicly, if one of us makes him her dear husband.  
This adjective zêlêmones is habitually translated ‘jealous’, which at first glance 
would seem to make sense; but on closer examination it becomes clear this is not 
the emotion Kalypso is referring to: she says that it is not merely sleeping with a 
man that is the problem, it is making him her husband. The verb agaasthe, which I 
have translated ‘resent’, is related to agan, which means ‘very much’ or ‘exces-
sively’; accordingly the verb can be translated in a good sense ‘to admire’, or in a 
bad sense ‘to be envious / bear a grudge against’. It is characteristically used in 
Homer to mean ‘begrudging’ or ‘resentment’,66 and this explains the prior use of 
zêlêmones: male gods (Kalypso says) believe female gods go too far, and accord-
ingly they feel some sort of censuring emotion for them. The scholia make the 
following comments:67 
(H.P.Q.) zêlêmones, jealous (zêlotypoi); baneful (dêlêmones), harmful. 
(V.) Baneful (dêlêmones) is written. 
 
62  Plutarch, Apophthegmata Lakonika 228c9–11: ἐν Σπάρτῃ ..., ἐν ᾗ πλοῦτος µὲν καὶ τρυφὴ 
καὶ καλλωπισµὸς ἀτιµάζονται, αἰδὼς δὲ καὶ εὐκοσµία καὶ τῶν ἡγουµένων πειθὼ πρε-
σβεύονται (my translation). 
63 Or at least for the Spartan ‘mirage’ – see note 13 above. 
64 The scholia started as explanatory comments written in the margins of manuscripts of major 
Greek authors. They eventually became more formalised from the third century BCE, as 
scholars working in the great library of Alexandria collected these comments and added to 
them (though the process continued for centuries after the destruction of the library in 48 
BCE). Some scholiasts wrote entire commentaries themselves on individual works, but for 
the most part the scholia are anonymous and undated. For a guide to using scholia, see 
Dickey 2007. For more advanced analysis, see Nünlist 2009. 
65 Homer, Odyssey 5.118–120: σχέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοί, ζηλήµονες ἔξοχον ἄλλων, | οἵ τε θεαῖσ’ 
ἀγάασθε παρ’ ἀνδράσιν εὐνάζεσθαι | ἀµφαδίην, ἤν τίς τε φίλον ποιήσετ’ ἀκοίτην (my 
translation). 
66 Walcot 1978, 25f. 
67 Scholia to Homer, Odyssey 5.118: (H.P.Q.) ζηλήµονες, ζηλότυποι· ἢ δηλήµονες, 
βλαπτικοί. (V.) γράφεται δηλήµονες – given in Dindorf 1855, 254 (my translation). 
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The scholiasts make the same mistake as modern translators in assuming, 
wrongly, that zêlêmones is a synonym for zêlotypoi,68 and that both have the 
meaning zêlotypoi has in the later period, i.e. ‘jealous’. The scholiasts do at least 
realise that ‘jealous’ is the wrong word in this context, that what is meant implies 
some sort of resentment, some desire to punish, but this leads them to the 
mistaken conclusion that zêlêmones must be the wrong word. They would not 
have been led down that path had they realised that zêlotypos had changed its own 
meaning over the centuries since the Classical period (as discussed above), and 
that zêlêmones need not mean the same as zêlotypoi in any case. 
Turning finally to zêlotypia itself, in a comment on Iliad 11.58 (‘Aeneas, who 
was honoured as a god by the Trojan people’), the scholiast writes:69 
This addition is not gratuitous, but displays the rankings of men; for this man was second 
after Hector; and because of this there was some jealousy (zêlotypia) between them; so they 
say anyway, for he was always angry with godlike Priam [the Trojan king], because he did 
not honour him at all despite him being noble among men.  
Zêlotypia is translated ‘jealousy’ here, but (just as in the Classical period) this is 
not sexual jealousy: rather it shows the jealousy of rivals.70 Zêlotypia frequently 
appears to be similar to phthonos (envy/possessive jealousy); the two are paired in 
a sexual context by Plato,71 but a Homeric scholiast pairs them in a non-sexual 
one: commenting on Nestor’s attempt to persuade Agamemnon to accept good 
counsel without grudging the person giving it, he says that Nestor ‘knows that 
many good deeds are destroyed though envy and anger and unjust jealousies’ (my 
translation).72  
Once again the context is not sexual but, this time, deliberative. Such scholia, 
though undated, have told us much about this elusive and controversial emotion, 





68  Both words derive from zêlos, which itself means ‘emulative rivalry’ and generally has no 
relation to sexual jealousy. 
69  Scholia to Homer, Iliad 11.58: οὐ µάτην ἡ προσθήκη, ἀλλ’ ἐµφαίνει τὴν τάξιν τῶν 
ἀνδρῶν· µετὰ γὰρ Ἕκτορα οὗτος δεύτερος· διὸ καὶ ζηλοτυπία ἦν τις αὐτοῖς· φησὶ γοῦν. 
αἰεὶ γὰρ Πριάµῳ ἐπεµήνιε δίῳ, οὕνεκ’ ἄρ’ ἐσθλὸν ἐόντα µετ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔ τι τίεσκεν – 
given in Erbse 1974, 135 (my translation). 
70 This is close in meaning to the etymological root zêlos – see note 68 above. 
71 At Plato, Symposium 213d2 – though the emotion referred to is again not sexual jealousy, as 
displayed in Chaireas and Kallirhoe, but rather possessive jealousy: Alcibiades knows of 
Socrates’ penchant for disbursing wisdom to attractive young men, and (since Socrates 
refused to take advantage of Alcibiades’ sexual advances) it must be this that Alcibiades 
wants all to himself. 
72  Scholia to Homer, Iliad 9.102: οἶδε γὰρ φθόνῳ καὶ θυµῷ καὶ ζηλοτυπίαις ἀδίκοις πολλὰς 
πράξεις ἀγαθὰς ἀνῃρηµένας – given in Erbse 1971, 419 (my translation). 
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5  CONCLUSION 
My aim in this chapter has not been primarily exegetic, but rather explorative: to 
broaden horizons, rather than to derive any new knowledge – though some new 
findings have emerged. The heterogeneous collection of passages discussed 
should, it is hoped, have given the reader some idea of the huge range of ancient 
Greek literary sources that are available to the historian of emotions, and the types 
of questions that such sources can, and cannot, answer. 
Literary sources have unique benefits not generally applicable to other types 
of source: we generally know something about the personality of their authors; 
many texts can be reasonably precisely dated; their intended readership (or 
audience) is generally known, as is the intention of the author in writing the text. 
Additionally, literary texts are generally far longer than other types of text, and 
accordingly provide a much wider narrative context. 
However, literary sources also have certain problems as sources for emotions: 
they are almost exclusively written by, and frequently intended to be read only by, 
men of higher education and wealth/status; and a disproportionately large number 
come from one city in a relatively brief period (Classical Athens). The historian 
must necessarily be concerned, therefore, with the extent to which such texts are 
representative of the wider society, or indeed other poleis and non-polis areas, and 
other periods. Further, many literary texts belong to genres which are partly or 
wholly fictional, and the historian must be wary that scenes portrayed may not be 
wholly reflective of real life, but rather literary topoi, or that details of a scene are 
unintentionally anachronistic. 
While literary sources do, therefore, raise methodological issues that must be 
recognised and resolved, they are far from unique in doing so, and are neverthe-
less an immensely rich source for the historian of emotions. Accordingly they 
fully deserve their place alongside the other types of evidence discussed in this 
volume. 
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